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Abstract: In geriatrics, driving cessation is addressed within the biopsychosocial model. This has
broadened the scope of practitioners, not only in terms of assessing fitness to drive, but also by
helping to maintain social engagements and provide support for transport transition. Causes can
be addressed at different levels by adapting medication, improving physical health, modifying
behaviour, adapting lifestyle, or bringing changes to the environment. This transdisciplinary
approach requires an understanding of how different disciplines are linked to each other. This
article reviews the philosophical principles of causality between fields and provides a framework
for understanding causality within the biopsychosocial model. Understanding interlevel constraints
should help practitioners overcome their differences, and favor transversal approaches to driving
cessation.
Keywords: traffic medicine; behavioural science; causality; transversal research
1. Clinical Situation
A 78-year-old driver with a past history of cardiovascular disease was told his condition would
not affect his fitness to drive, as long as he complied with his medication requirement to treat
his arrhythmia. The patient is very attached to driving and attributes a feeling of freedom and
independence to his car. He lives alone in a remote area and says he needs his car to do his
shopping and meet with his friends and family. Recently, he has started suffering from mild cognitive
impairment. A neuropsychologic assessment has nevertheless concluded that it was not yet severe
enough to justify having to stop driving. It was therefore decided to monitor the situation and plan
a transport transition phase within the next two years. He is now followed by an occupational
therapist who has recently reported that the patient’s condition has worsened and that the patient
expresses strong resistance to the idea of giving up driving. A meeting with the physician, the
patient’s daughter, and the occupational therapist has been scheduled to discuss a solution to the
problem and seriously consider driving cessation. Indeed, the patient’s mental health state had
worsened to a point where he frequently forwent his treatment and occasionally drove with heart
palpitations. After forgetting to take his medication several days in a row, his heart condition severely
worsened while he was driving. He lost consciousness and his vehicle hit the side of the road before
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continuing onto the sidewalk. Unfortunately, at the same moment, a 14-year-old student, late for
school, was speeding down the same sidewalk on his kick scooter and could not prevent himself from
crashing into the side of the car, which had just come to a halt. The velocity of the impact immediately
broke the young man’s left femur before he flew over the car and landed on the sidewalk, causing
superficial skin wounds and a few bruises. What were the causes of the accident?
2. Introduction
Identifying the cause of such events has become important to define legal responsibilities, define
modalities of reimbursements by insurance companies, improve health management, develop and
promote evidence informed prevention policies, suggest changes in road regulations, and identify
needs in infrastructures. For most drivers, the link between their age, their cognitive decline and
their driving performance remains difficult to assess without an on-road evaluation [1,2]. There
is indeed only a very weak association between reduced performance on neuropsychological tests
and driving performance [3]. Furthermore, increased rates of traffic related deaths with age are
mostly explained by decreased tolerance to injury rather than by age related changes in driving
behaviour [4]. The physician’s role in assessing fitness to drive has therefore shifted from a pure
traffic safety perspective [5,6] to a broader perspective that includes other priorities related to driving
cessation [7], out-of-home mobility [8,9], mood disorders [10], and quality of life [11]. Physicians and
medical practitioners are the privileged partners patients rely on to facilitate their transport transition
and prevent social isolation and depression [12]. This biopsychosocial approach of driving cessation
requires transdisciplinary skills and a better understanding of causality across disciplines. This article
will therefore introduce philosophical principles of causation from different scientific domains and
provide an ontological position adapted to the biopsychosocial model.
3. Ontological Positions
When working at the frontiers of different domains, it is very important to keep in mind
that professionals do not necessarily have the same expectations from scientific work and do not
necessarily rely on the same concepts to assert causal relationships. Taking a transversal approach
towards a given problem therefore requires practitioners and researchers to recognise the role,
strength and limitations of each domain and to clearly understand how they contribute to solving
societal problems.
Basic science usually considers causality as the physical mechanism that explains the link
between cause and effect. It aims for a better understanding of complex interactions in matter
(mechanical approach). For epidemiologists, causality is seen as the link by which we can modify
systems. This more practical approach, therefore, does not seek to explain causes but only to identify
them (probabilistic approach). For example, in ageing populations, social engagement could prevent
future disabilities [13]. In psychology, researchers mainly aim to model and explain behaviour
through mental states using statistics (causal modelling). The Montreal Cognitive Assessment
(MoCA) used to detect cognitive disorders is an example of causal modelling [14]. Sociologists
mainly use statistics to test models associating social indicators to group behaviour (statistical
inference). The emergence of geographical gerontology is a perfect example of the need to integrate
notions from sociology into geriatrics [15]. Finally, causality in the legal system is founded in the
concept of conformity. Moral entities are held responsible for an event if their behaviour has been
non-conforming and it can be proven that the event was caused by this behaviour (non-conformity
causality). Contraflow driving on the highway, for instance, would be considered as a cause of an
accident, if it were to occur.
3.1. Mechanical Causality and Basic Science
Mechanical causality in science is the explanation of how parts of a system give certain properties
to a whole system through the interactions between its parts [16]. Within a system, structural
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modifications of entities (effects) are produced by activities (causes) [17]. The physical exchanges
that take place show regularity [18] and are therefore replicable in similar conditions (deterministic
approach). It is therefore possible to study a one to one links between cause and effect. A condition
becomes a cause when it inevitably leads to the effect and that this effect cannot occur without the
condition [19]. This strict determinism approach is the milestone of basic science and is often referred
to as sufficiency causation or necessity causation. In geriatrics, this approach of causality is widely
used to identify and describe underlying biological mechanisms at a molecular level [17]. In our
clinical scenario (see Section 1. Clinical situation), the fracture will depend on the propensity of
the limb to deform and resist the applied force resulting from the impact of both moving objects.
The mass of the car, intrinsic properties of bone to withstand loading and the trajectory of the kick
scooter on the sidewalk are therefore some of the mechanical causes of the fracture. Identifying such
causes can provide clues for preventive policies and also provide normative values for material safety
regulations. Mechanical causality can also identify mechanism by which genetic factors can modulate
cognitive decline and thereby define biomarkers indicating the onsets of a mental disease [20].
Advantages: In behavioural science, mechanical causality has many advantages over other
definitions of causality. First, it can distinguish causes from consequences. Secondly, it explains
underlying mechanisms that help consider possible solutions to prevent an event from taking place.
Thirdly, the causal link is verifiable using an experimental approach in a controlled environment [21].
This approach is therefore epistemologically sound and provides a causal explanation we can rely on.
Limitations: Mechanical causality has some limitations. First, mechanical causality does not
provide any information on the likelihood of a situation occurring and therefore cannot attribute
different weight to different causes implied in a phenomenon. In other words, at a mechanical
level, all causal factors are equally responsible for a given event. Secondly, defining mechanical
causality highly depends upon the amount of control that can be exercised over the environment
in which the studied phenomenon takes place. When studying complex phenomena, mechanical
causality can therefore often arise in experimental or hypothetical observations that are not relevant
in real life situations. Finally, mechanical causality is limited in determining states of complex
uncontrolled systems through time. Laws that govern matter are not as deterministic as we presumed
them to be. At a sub-molecular level, some forces that govern the organisation of matter are,
by their nature, unpredictable [22]. These forces provide the scientific explanation of the part of
unpredictability that can be observed at other levels (molecular, biochemical, cellular, intercellular,
organism, inter-organism, environment etc.) and are called stochastic events. In our brains, stochastic
events at a quantum level explain variations in gene transmission [23], in gene transcription [24], and
in variability in synaptic transmission and plasticity [25,26]. Defining mental states as a mechanical
cause of an accident is therefore close to impossible. Indeed, mechanical causality can only explain
the state of brain activity for a few milliseconds.
3.2. Inter-Level Constraints
Systems can be defined at different levels of organisation (Figure 1). If mechanical causation
was all about reduction, then changes at any level should theoretically be explainable by interactions
at any lower levels. This however does not apply to elementary particles. At this level, reduction
becomes impossible. We can therefore admit that mechanical causality is designed to explain
interactions between parts of a system but not necessarily to reduce the explanation to a lower
level. Mechanical causation can even be used to explain consequences at a higher level. It is a
common procedure to enhance changes at a molecular level by administrating or prescribing drugs,
and then observe the effects on individuals’ behaviour (bottom-up experiments). An example is the
prescription of anti-epileptic drugs and the absence of seizure during 12 months justifying fitness to
drive [27].
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Figure 1. Trade-off between realism and control when working at different levels of organisation. At
higher levels of complexity, causality is more difficult to assess. At higher levels of control, results are
more difficult to apply in real-world situations.
We however also intervene at a behaviour level and then identify changes at a structural
level (top-down experiments). Observing effects of a mindfulness based intervention on brain
structural changes using MRI illustrates this [28]. Both these designs presumes we accept that
mechanical causality can affect different levels of organisation. However, the direct link between
effects at one level and consequences on another level is not straightforward. The epistemological
grounding of inter-level causality becomes weaker and does not meet the criteria set by sufficiency
causation or necessity causation. Kistler [16] overcame this problem by distinguishing constraints
from causality. For him, "a constraint limits the possibilities of evolution or change accessible to
a system" and this takes effect within and across levels. Therefore, mental causality can be seen
as the result of constraints rising from neuronal activity [29]. Admitting inter-level constraints has
major implications in the conception of mechanical causality in science. When studying mechanical
causality across different levels, it is necessary to provide physical explanations of how changes at
one level affect conditions at another level to the point that it constrains change in this system.
In our fictional situation, inter-level constraints could provide explanations on why some patients
with dementia deny encountering difficulties whereas others might tend to exaggerate them. The
notion of inter-level constraints can also inspire grounded models on how to counter resistance to
driving cessation and address the problem differently depending of the social context. Inter-level
constraints also explains why we cannot certify that the accident would not have occurred had the
driver taken his medication. Therefore, it remains impossible to know for certain if the driver’s
cognitive impairment is one of the causes of the accident. This can be assumed uniquely if we base
our inferences on a probabilistic approach.
Advantages: First, inter-level constraint widens the field of mechanical causality to include
causality by omission and non-occurrence causality. The direct physical link between the absence
of a cause and its effect does not have to exist any more. In other words, it is conceptually sound to
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consider that the absence of a cause at one level can modify constraints at another level. Public health
is often concerned about how to prevent something from happening. When developing treatments,
inter-level constraint is therefore indispensable to link the mechanical effect of the treatment with
the non-occurrence of symptoms [30]. Secondly, inter-level constraints are essential for mechanical
causality to provide explanations on how changes at a molecular level can enhance changes at a
behavioural level and vice versa. This widens the field of application and supports treatments other
than those at the molecular level. Finally, the concept of inter-level constraints opens the field of
personalised medicine. Treatments can be adapted to individuals’ personal level of constraints.
Limitations: This approach nevertheless does not offer the possibility of accepting links between
levels without acknowledging the physical constraints that one level has over another. Given the
difficulty of providing such explanations at higher levels, we can use epidemiology, psychology
and sociology to overcome this problem, by using a probabilistic approach to define causality.
Epidemiology, psychology and sociology all rely on empirical observations and statistical inference
to develop models of causation.
3.3. Epidemiology
Science might seek to know the extent to which conditions will tend to interact with each other
and participate in an effect, without wanting to provide any explanation of underlying mechanisms.
In this situation, a probabilistic approach is often preferred to a mechanical approach of causality.
Even if mechanical causality can take multiple factors into consideration (sufficient-component
causes) [31], this approach fails to take interactions into consideration or correctly model dose-effect
response. Probabilistic causality in epidemiology has made it possible to attribute probability of
multicausality, evaluate interactions among causes, and to estimate the strength of causes and the
attributable fraction of a cause to a disease [32]. In observational studies, it is, however, often
impossible to separate causal from non-causal associations. To limit false assumptions, Hill [33]
proposed a list of nine viewpoints necessary to pass from the assumption of association to the one
of causality (strength, consistency, specificity, temporality, biological gradient, plausibility, coherence,
experimental evidence and analogy). There are, however, no absolute criteria for asserting the validity
of scientific evidence in observational epidemiological studies. Therefore, Rothman [32] insists on the
importance on relying on thorough criticism. Even experimental designs (randomised clinical trials)
and meta-analysis are prone to bias that requires training and skills to recognise.
In our fictitious situation, probabilistic causality can estimate the attribution fraction of
non-adherence to treatment in causing palpitations. It can also estimate the increased risk for road
accident for drivers with different degrees of cognitive disorders [3], or predict the probability of
being hit by a car when riding a kick scooter out on the street [34]. It can also predict the growing
population of older drivers and help anticipate emerging problems [35].
Advantages: First, an epidemiological approach can construct models of interaction and take
dose-response relations into consideration. These models can also easily takes stochastic events
into consideration and can provide a long-term prediction of probability of future events. Secondly,
probability causality can also attribute different weights to multiple causes and include factors from
different levels of organisation (e.g., biologic markers, behaviour traits and social indicators). Finally,
probabilistic causality can easily consider the absence of a cause, as a cause (counterfactuals) [36].
Limitations: The main limitation of epidemiology in science is that it does not provide any clear
explanation of the underlying mechanisms linking a cause to an event. This approach is therefore
entirely dependent on basic science and mechanical causality approaches to explain what it discovers.
The second main difficulty is that probabilistic causality cannot distinguish simple associations
from causal links unless we can assume that all other factors are held constant. Randomised
clinical trials are therefore examples of controlled systems in which causal associations can be
assumed. Conclusions can nevertheless subject to other sources of misinterpretation. Finally, for
communication purposes, probabilistic causality in epidemiology most often concerns populations
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and not individuals. Patients often believe they are the exceptions and therefore do not always
rely on conclusions drawn from populations. Focusing research on methods to improve clinicians’
communication skills for risks is often neglected in public health but should be set as a priority.
3.4. Psychology
Neuropsychological tests, behavioural questionnaires and psychological models are some of
the instruments developed by causal modelling in psychology. In geriatrics, these instruments are
used to assess cognition and behaviour by psychiatrists, psychologists, experts and primary care
physicians [3,37]. They are developed after observing multiple patients with similar symptoms or
unusual behaviour. From these observations, traits can be attributed as parts of a given mental state.
Probabilistic causality is then used to assess the weight of each of these traits in defining the mental
state. The final model’s ability to discriminate patient profiles with different mental states validates
the entire procedure. This approach therefore helps provide reliable psychological explanations to
certain mental states or behaviours.
For driving, psychological models can provide explanations on individuals’ acceptance of
different level of risks, from which they adapt their driving strategy [38]. This influences their ability
to anticipate, plan, decide and react to situations. When modelling driving cessation, we are however
facing a major challenge; the difficulties in transposing results from neuropsychological tests to the
real-life situation [39]. Geriatrics therefore needs to develop more complex psychological models
that could serve to formulate guidelines for managing different profiles of patients who are resistant
to transport transition. Psychology remains one of the most important contributors in traffic safety
for finding adapted solutions to change people’s behaviour and prevent them from maintaining or
adopting attitudes at risk [40].
Advantages: First of all, causal modelling makes it possible to quantify an individual’s mental
state. Secondly, causal modelling also makes it possible to study interactions between different mental
states in a single individual or between individuals. Finally, psychological causal modelling also
provides precious indications of the risk of certain behaviours by individuals.
Limitations: This method assumes that subpopulations share common underlying mechanisms
explaining their behaviour. These mechanisms however remain most often unknown. For similar
mental states, different models can therefore come up with different explanations and classify
conditions accordingly. This is done without been able to test the validity of a model over another.
Relying on lower-level studies therefore remains essential to support causal modelling in psychology.
3.5. Social Science
Like for epidemiology and psychology, social science relies on statistical inference to model
causal relationships. It often relies on global indicators and obtain the best "fit" between a constructed
model and collected data [41]. Since the 80s, sociologists often rely on Mackie’s theory of causality:
the INUS-condition (insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but
sufficient). This approach uses a set of conditions and guarantees non-redundancy. Approaches in
sociology (INUS-condition, partial correlation and probabilistic cause) are based on correlation and
association analysis. As in psychology, the concept of causality in social science is not as strong as
in basic science. Sociology remains an interesting approach to identify associations between social
indicators and societal events [41]. In geriatrics, sociology has largely contributed in understanding
the meaning older drivers give to driving in their social context [42]. There is nevertheless a need for
more to be done to account for social aspects of driving cessation when providing support to older
drivers [43].
3.6. Non-Conformity Causality
There are multiple examples of social laws regulating our behaviour. Let us focus on road safety
regulations. If the conditions necessary to cause an accident are in place, there is a given point in
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time when road users cannot change them and an accident becomes inevitable. Traffic regulations
have therefore been defined to help road users anticipate events and act accordingly with each other,
while preserving traffic fluidity as much as possible. In other words, road regulations are meant to
give people sufficient time to identify danger, react in consequence and prevent collisions. These laws
are governed by social agreement and conformity and as such are not deterministic. Nevertheless,
not respecting such laws will modify constraints at a behavioural level. Road users will not be able
to anticipate situations as expected. Non-conformity causality can thereby be linked to mechanical
causality at a lower level. For non-conformity causality to take place, it remains essential to verify
that in the given circumstances, had the person conformed to social rules, the event would not have
taken place. Only under this condition should we consider non-conformity causality as a potential
cause of events.
The usual way to consider non-conformity causality is to consider all the sufficient conditions for
an event to take place, and then estimate which is unexpected or unusual and define it as the cause.
In our fictive situation, driving a car on the sidewalk while unconscious and riding a kick scooter on
the sidewalk do not conform to social expectations and can be considered as causes of the accident.
If it can be proven that the young man would not have been injured had he been on foot, or that the
senior driver would not have lost control of his car had he not forgotten to take his medication, both
the young man and the driver could be held responsible for the accident. However, for someone’s
responsibility to be engaged, it also has to be shown that they could have complied to social rules had
they wanted to. In our clinical situation, the cognitive state of the driver could therefore disengage
him from his responsibility.
Advantages: First, non-conformity causality can be studied by both probabilistic and mechanical
approaches of causality. This approach can therefore provide explanations on the importance of
societal rules in preventing or favouring events at a societal level. Secondly, this approach is the only
approach that can attribute an individual’s level of responsibility to a given event. For this reason,
it is often used by the legal system to establish links of causality between an individual’s action (or
inaction) and damage.
Limitations: This type of cause is based on expectations and social conformity. The laws to
which these causes respond are not absolute and can vary in time or space (different social groups
can have different expectations and expectations can change over time). The constraint that this level
has over other levels is therefore versatile, and transposing observations from one situation to another
requires much caution.
4. Transdisciplinary approach
Human behaviour is influenced by many factors at many levels, making it one of the most
complex systems to study in science. As we have seen, defining unfitness to drive can range
from identifying irreversible molecular changes in neural networks to identifying an individual’s
incapacity to adapt their driving behaviour to new road regulations. With cognitive decline, the
problem of driving cessation and traffic safety has been shown to be much less important as
initially presumed except for very advanced conditions that also makes other daily tasks at home
difficult [3,44,45]. The health impact of forced driving cessation seems to be of higher concern [7,46].
There is therefore a natural shift in the domain towards also addressing the problem of social
isolation and independence rather than traffic safety alone [12]. This shift is inevitable given cars are
already equipped with automatic braking systems, parking systems, and new technology increasing
passengers’ security. In a close future, it will be more common that cars are programmed to anticipate
events and automatically prevent accidents. Therefore, we might encounter potential problems
concerning older drivers who want to maintain control over their vehicle. Traffic safety research
also needs to tackle the question of how to help older drivers trust emerging technologies. This
requires psychologists, engineers, geriatrics, neuroscientists to work together across different levels
of organisation [47]. Higher-level research provides important clues on which hypothesis to test at
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lower levels. Higher-level research can also provide feedback on the applicability of lower-level
discoveries and help decide when to abandon or favour a lead. On the other hand, lower-level
research provides explanations for higher-level interactions. This can help improve systems to target
goals more efficiently and improve predictions. Transversal research therefore embraces problems in
their complexity and provides coordinated interpretations of results across multiple levels to explore,
develop, and assess possible applicable solutions to a problem [48]. These efforts can be enhanced by
prompting interdisciplinary collaborative projects. Limitations from one domain can be compensated
by advantages from another; there is a trade-off between fidelity and experimental control (Figure 1).
For clinicians and researchers from different fields to work together, it helps to keep in mind that
accepting a causal link is highly dependent of the compatibility of any proposition with their own
belief system [49]. We will therefore probably remain suspicious of other sources of knowledge than
our own. This scepticism is beneficial as long as we put efforts in continuously aligning our concepts
of causality to the ones of other speakers. Building a consortium of clinicians or researchers who can
focus on common goals within a clear framework is probably the most cost-effective way of finding
optimal adapted solutions to transportation needs and safety.
5. Conclusions
In respect of the biopsychosocial model, the psychological and social aspect of driving cessation
need to be accounted for when managing older patients with emerging cognitive deficits. Helping
older patients through this transition phase is a way of preventing the burden of social isolation [50].
Research has however neglected this aspect of driving cessation; maybe due to the difficulty of
addressing age related needs in transport transition by a single domain. There is an urgent need
for updated guidelines that take all dimensions of driving cessation into account. Collaborative
transdisciplinary approaches could help find optimal implementable solutions to help clinicians
address the problem. In complex uncontrolled systems, conditions vary considerably between
individuals and within individuals at different time frames. Therefore, causes at one level can have a
wide variability of effects at another level. It is only through inter-level constraints that modifications
at one level can alter conditions at another level. This concept of inter-level constraints provides a
solid foundation for clinicians and scientists from different domains to work with one another and
highlights the importance of each discipline in achieving common goals.
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